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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, (
(

vs.

No.

10401

JACK YOUNGLOVE,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought pursuant to the provisious of Title 77, Chapter 60, Utah Code Annotated,
Hl.53. for the purpose of securing a judicial determination that the defendant is the natural father of an
illegitimate child.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action arising out of a complaint signed
by Betty Wallberg, pursuant to Section 77-60-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, accusing the defendant with
being the father of her illegitimate child. The case was
subsequently tried to a jury and from a verdict in favor
of plaintiff, and the denial of defendant's Motion for
New Trial, defendant appeals.
The record herein establishes the following uncontroverted facts:
At the time of trial, the defendant was serving a
sentence in the Utah State Prison arising out of his
conviction, on or about December 18, 1964, of the crime
of burglary.
The defendant first met Betty Wall berg at the
Ute Bar in Salt Lake City, Utah, where she was employed as a bar maid, during the first week in January
of 1964 (R. 34, 47 and 62). Thereafter, the defendant
saw Betty Wallberg frequently at the Ute Bar, (R.
72) and on six occasions on and before January 20,
2

19G4, the defendant gave Betty 'Vall berg, and Marie,

the owuer of the Ute Bar, a ride home after the bar
closed (R. 73 and 74).
Betty 'Vall berg had her last menstrual period,
prior to the birth of her child, commencing January
'27, 1964 and ending February 1, 1964. This menstrual
period was a "regular" one and was consistent with
her established menstrual cycle of approximately thirty
days ( R. 36) . No medical evidence was introduced hy
the plaintiff at the trial whatsoever. The child was subsequently born on November 12, 1964 (R. 39-40).
During the course of the trial the defendant took
the witness stand in his own behalf and testified that
"I never seen Betty from January 20th until
March-after .March 15, any place." (R. 66).
on cross-examination, which counsel for the plaintiff
asked the following questions to which the following
answers were given and the following objections were
made:
"BY l\1R. 'VIND]'.R:

Q 'Vhat is your present address, Mr. Younglove?
MR. lHARTINEAU: I object to that.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I think
this is irrelevant and immaterial and an effort
to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury.
I would object to it on that ground.
THE COURT: Sustained.
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Q (Mr. Winder) Have you ever been convicted
of a felony, Mr. Younglove?

A Yes.
Q What felony?

A Burglary.
Q Where?

A Salt Lake.

Q The date of your conviction?
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I object
to that as irrelevant and immaterial, the date
of it.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
MR. MARTINEAU: :May I have an exception, he is trying to get in through the back door
through this line of questions what he was unable to elicit with the other question.
THE COURT: 'Vhat is your answer?
A Box 250, Draper, Utah.
Mr. Winder:
Q What is the date you were committed or sentenced?

A December 18, 1964." (R. 71-72).
The record shows that further on in the trial the
following testimony was given:
"Q Did you give Mrs. 'Vallberg a ride borne?

A Yes.
Q On how many separate occasions do you
think?
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A Six times.

Q

' Tas the first of these on January 20th?

A No, the last of them.

THE COURT: What?
THE \VITNESS: The last of them.

Q (.Mr. "Tinder) "\Vhen was the first time?
A The second night I knew her.

Q \Vhat was your reason for giving Mrs. Wallberg a ride home?

A YV ell, she didn't seem to have any way home.

Q \Vas there any other reason?
A No, sir.
Q Did you have sexual intercourse with her on
any of those nights?

A I refuse to answer on the grounds it might
incriminate and disgrace me.

THE COURT: You have to answer it.
l\IR. I\'IARTINEAU: I would object to
that. I think he should limit the examination of
the questions to the period of her gestation, and
not-should not open it up to the prior period
of January and clear through March.
THE COURT: Overruled.
The Court requires you to answer that question.

A Yes.
Q (Mr. \Vinder) Did you have intercourse on
every occasion, J\fr. Younglove?
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A Pardon?
Q Did you on all six of those occasions?
A Yes." (R.74-75).
ARGU~IENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, OVER OBJECTION, TO
QUE S TI 0 N DEFENDANT REGARDING
THE DETAILS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING TO DE:F'ENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION AND CONFINEMENT
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro· ,
vides that:
""A witness must answer questions legal and
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his
answer may establish a claim against himself;
but he need not give an answer which will have
a tendency to subject him to punishment for a
felony; nor need he give an answer which will
have a direct tendency to degrade his character,
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer as to the fact of his
previous conviction of felony."
Although it is clear under the foregoing pnwision
that a witness must answer as to the fact of a previous
felony conviction, it is equally clear under the decisions
6

of this Court that once the witness has answered as to
the fact of his prior conviction, further inquiry regarding his conviction is foreclosed. State v. Johnson, 76
Gtah 8.J<, 287 P.909 (1930); State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1,
llO P.434 ( 1910).
l'.

The applicable rule is stated as follows in State
Vance, supra, 38 Utah at 37, no Pac. at 447.
"Under our statute any witness, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, may be asked
whether or not he has previously been convicted
of a felony. If he answers "yes," this ends the
inquiry; and, if he answers "no," the record of
his conviction is conclusive against him . . ."
(Emphasis added).

In State v . .Johnson, supra, 76 Utah at 95, 287 Pac. at
913, the rule adopted in State v. Vance, supra, was
again followed and reaffirmed as follows:
"A witness, as affecting his credibility, may
be asked if he had not previously been convicted
of a felony ,and the kind or name of the felony,

but not as to the details or circumstances of it."
(Emphasis added).

In the instant case the Court permitted plaintiff's
counsel to question the defendant, over objection, reganli11g the date of his conviction. This question was
obviously irrelevant and immaterial and was no doubt
intended to make the jury aware that the defendant
was then being confined in the Utah State Prison.
:.lore importantly, this question was outside the scope
d c \ ·nni1wtion permitted by Section 78-24-9, and the
tlcl i-,ions of this Court, quoted and cited hereinabove.
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The action by the Court in requiring the defendant
to answer the question regarding the date of his conviction was, for the reasons stated above, clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. The defendant
is, therefore, entitled to be awarded a new trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, CONTRARY
TO AND IN VIOLATION AND DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
The following uncontroverted facts are established
by the record herein:
1. The information filed herein alleges that Betty
Wallberg became pregnant with the subject child on
or about February 10, 1964 (R. 1).

2. Betty Wallberg's last menstrual period, prior to
the birth of her child, commenced on January 27, 1964
and ended February 1, 1964 (R. 36).

3. Betty Wallberg's last menstrual period, prior
to the birth of the child, was a "regular" period an<l
was consistent with her established menstrual cycle of
approximately thirty days (R. 36).
4. The child was born on November 12, 1964 weighing eight pounds six ounces ( R. 39-40) .
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The foregoing facts clearly establish that Betty
\{a!lberg conceived the child sometime after January
'27, liHi± and that she could not have, and did not, concci\"e the c.folcl prior to that date. A contrary conclusion
cannot reasonably be drawn from these facts.
:Following the presentation of the plaintiff's case
the defendant took the witness stand in his own behalf
and testified, among other things, that he did not see
Betty lVallberg at any time during the period from
January 20, 1964 to March 15, 1964 ( R. 66-67). No
questions were asked the defendant on his direct examination regarding possible sexual relations between the
defendant and Betty Wallberg prior to January 20,
HlG±. On cross-examination, however, counsel for plaintiff asked the following questions to which the following
answers were given and the following objections and
rulings were made:

"Q Did you have sexual intercourse with her on
any ~f those nights [on or prior to January
20, 1964}?

A I refuse to answer on the grounds it might
incriminate and disgrace me.

THE COURT: You have to answer it.
MR. MARTINEAU: I would object to

that. I think he should limit the examination of
the questions to the period of her gestation, and
not-should not open it up to the prior period
of January and clear through March.

THE COURT: 0Yerruled.
The Court requires you to answer that question.
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A Yes.
Q (Mr. Winder) Did you have intercourse
every occasion, Mr. Younglove?

011

A Pardon?
Q Did you on all six of those occasions?
A Yes." (R. 74-75).
These questions by plaintiff's counsel were clearly
improper and the defendant should not have been compelled by the trial court to answer them because they
were outside of the scope of the direct examination and
they were irrelevant and immaterial, since the facts
established by the record made it perfectly clear that
Betty Wallberg could not have and did not conceive
the child until sometime after January 27, 1964.
More significantly, the action of the trial court in
compelling the defendant to answer these questions,
after the defendant had refused to answer on the ground
that it might incriminate and degrade him and orer
objection of counsel, violated and deprived the de·
fendant of his rights against self-incrimination and
self-degradation guaranteed to him by the :Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America, Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah, Section 77-1-10, Utah Code An·
notated, 1953, and Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Anno·
tated, 1953.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitulinu
of the United States of America provides in part :1 1
follows:
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"No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment, has recently held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each of the separate States safeguard to the individual the rights afforded to him under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. l, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (June 1964). The Fifth Amendment provides in part as follows:
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ... "
In holding that the federal privilege against selfincrimination applies to State laws and proceedings, as
well as federal, the United States Supreme Court in
Malloy v. Ho,r;an, supra, 378 U.S. at 8, 84 S. Ct. at
1493, stated the applicable rule as follows:

"The Fourteenth Amendment secures against
State invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement - The right of a person to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty,
as held in Twining, for such silence." (Emphasis
added).
'l'he pri,·ilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies
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not only in the case of a witness in a criminal proceeding but also in the case of a witness in a civil proceeding if the answer might tend to subject the witness tr;
criminal liability. The applicable rule is stated as follows in the case of McCarthy v. Arndstein, 26G U.S.
34, 40, 45 S. Ct. 16, 17 ( 1924) :
"The government insists, broadly, that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The
contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature
of the proceeding in which the testimony is
sought or is to be used, It applies alike to civil
and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility
him who gives it."
See also Murphy v. Water.front Com'n o.f New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964); Malloy
v. Hogan, supra; Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 78 S. Ct. 622 (1958).

A review of Section 76-53-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes it clear that the defendant roulr1
not answn the questions which the trial court compelled
him to answer without subjecting himself to possible
criminal responsibility.
Although, by taking the witness stand in his own
behalf, the defendant may have waived the rights against
self-incrimination guaranteed him by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as to matters which he Jll:lY
have testified to and opened upon direct examination
he did not by taking the witness stand waive these rights
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as to possible incriminating matters which were not the
subject of his testimony on direct examination. Emspack v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S. Ct. 687
(1955); Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516 (1 Cir.
1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 827; Isaacs
v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (8 Cir. 1958); United
States v. 'Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3 Cir. 1949); United
States v. Hoag, 142 F. Supp. 667 (D.C.D.C. 1956).
Moreover, it should be noted that every presumption
must be indulged against the waiver of the right against
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments and a waiver of the privilege is not
to be lightly inferred. Emspack v. United States, supra;
Sherman v. I-Iamilton, supra; Isaacs v. United States,
supra.
The privilege applies to all incriminating matters
which have not been opened up on direct examination,
United States v. Toner, supra, and unless the facts
which are testified to on direct examination are actually
incriminating, the privilege cannot be held to have been
waived. United States v. Hoag, supra, cites a large
number of the cases which have passed upon the question as to what constitutes a waiver of the right against
self-incrimination. The general rule followed in these
cases is then summarized as follows:
"The rule of law, therefore, as announced by
these cases, is that the voluntary answer must
be 'criminating' to prevent the witness from
stopping short and refusing further explanation. The defendant in this case did not testfiy
as to any criminating fact; on the contrary her
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testimony relied on by the Government as requiring her to answer the questions herein illvolved were completely non-criminating in character and under the authorities above mentioned
she had the right to 'stop short' and assert he;.
privilege."
The defendant in the instant case did not testify
on direct examination as to any criminating fact, nor
any other facts, relating to any sexual relations with
Betty Wall berg prior to January 27, 1964. Accordingly, the defendant did not waive his rights against
self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as to possible criminating facts
relating to the period on or prior to January 20, 196l
In addition to the rights against self-incriminatiou
guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution.
the defendant also has such rights guaranteed to him
by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah a~ by Sections 77-1-10 and 78-2.J.-9.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Article I, Section 12
of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides in
part:
"The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself
"
Section 77 -1-10 provides:
"The accused shall not be compelled to qitc
evidence ar;ainst himself . . ,, (Emphasis a<ldcd).
Section 78-24-9 proYides further that:
"A witness must answer questions legal and
pertinent to the matter in issue, although !us
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answer may establish a claim against himself;
but he need not give an answer which will have
a tendency to subject him to punishment for a
felony; nor need he give an answer which will
have a direct tendency to degrade his character
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer as to the fact of his
previous conviction of a felony." (Emphasis
added).
As in the case of the federally guaranteed right
against self-incrimination, the protection applies in civil
as well as in criminal proceedings. As was stated by
this Court in the case of State v. Byington, 114 Utah
388, 391, 200 p .2d 723, 724 ( 1948) :
"It is generally recognized that the privilege
against self-incrimination provided for in those
constitutional provisions [Fifth Amendment to
Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12
of the Utah State Constitution] protects a witness as well as a party accused of crime in a
civil as well as in a criminal action from being
required to give testimony which tends to incriminate him. It is further generally recognized that
any fact which is 'a necessary or essential part
of a crime' if testified to by a witness would tend
to incriminate him."

The question as to what testimony by a witness
on <lirect examination will act as a waiver of his state
girnranteed right against self-incrimination and selftkgradation has been considered by this Court preY!ously. Slate ~'. Shocldey, 29 Utah 25, 80 Pac. 865
( 1905) ; State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434
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( 1910) ; State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208 117 Pac ..58
( 1911) ; State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270
(1913); Sadleir v. Youny, 97 Utah 291, 85 Pac. 2d
810 ( 1938) ; State v. B/jington, 114 Utah 388, 200 Pac.
2d 723 (1948).
In the case of State v. Vance, supra, 38 Utah
at 32-33, 110 Pac. at 445, the defendant who was
being prosecuted for murder was cross-examined by
the prosecution, over objection, regarding certain conversations and facts ·which the defendant had not
testified to on his direct examination. In holding
that such cross-examination was improper this Coml
stated:
"The rule is that as to whether the accused
has made certain admissions, or his made state·
ments of material. facts against himself, and
everything which may contradict, morlify, ex·
plain, or make clearer, limit, or enlarge the meaning of the statements made by him while testify·
ing with respect to any subject of which he has
testified, may be inquired into on cross-exami·
nation. The inquiry must, however, be limited
to the subject-matters gone into by the witness
in his testimony in chief ... Where the accused.
as a witness, denies that he committed or was
connected with the commission of the criminal act
or acts constituting the offense for which he is
being tried, the cross-examination ordinarily
must be permitted to extend to the whole range
of facts which in some way relate to the trans·
action constituting the offense. But u•herc. ns
in the case at bar, the witness limits his state:
1nents to negativing or explaining mere isohitcd
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facts, or merely states what occurred at a particular time and place, then what took pfope
at such time and place ordinarily constitutes the
subject matter upon which the witness testified,
and the cross-examination should be limited to
that suhject .... [W]e cannot see upon what
theory the court's r-ulings can be sustained by
which appellant was required to answer the
questions relating to the conversations and statements that were inquired into respecting the
beating and bruising and deceased's condition
attributable thereto. Appellant had neither directly nor indirectly denied, nor in any way negatived his connection with the beating. He left
the subject untouched in his examination in
chief. The subject, therefore, was not opened
up for cross-examination."
In the case of State v. Thorne, supra, 39 Utah
at 223-24, 117 Pac. at 63, the defendant testified on his own behalf regarding certain occurrences
which he had participated in on the date of the robbery
for which he was being tried. He was then asked, on
cross-examination, about the facts relating to his acquisition of the gun used in the robbery. This Court held
such cross-examination improper in the following language:

"'Vhen a question is asked which relates to
incriminating acts, or calls for evidence of an
incriminating character, separate and distinct
from those on trial or testified to by him, he, like
auy other witness, may claim the privilege and
decline to answer it."
In the case of Sadlier v. Young, supra, the defendant
was being prosecuted for carnal knowledge of a minor.
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The complaint under which the defendant was being
prosecuted alleged that the offense had taken place on
July 27, 1938. During the course of the trial the minor
was called as a witness and asked whether or not she ha<l
had any sexual intercourse with the defendant betweeu
July 4, 1938 and July 27, 1938. The Court then required the witness to answer this question over objection
of counsel. In commenting upon this ruling, this Court
held as fallows:

"The record discloses that when the question
was asked to which claim of privilege was made,
counsel for the defendant Kaddas interposed the
general objection of immateriality, incompetency and irrelevancy. As the evidence of the
case then stood that objection should have been
sustained. Had such ruling been made, the necessity of claiming privilege would not have arisen
on the part of applicant for this writ .... The
danger of permitting such situation going to a
jury is that a defendant may be found guilty
of an offense similar in character upon a different date, but not charged, or, if charged, excluded by the election the law makes upon the
introduction of testimony as to the act proposed '
to be proved."

*
*
*
*
"This bring us to the remaining provision of
the statute to the effect that a witness 'need not
give an answer * * * which will have a direcl
tendency to degrade his character, unless it. i1
to the verv fact in issue or to a fact from .rhll'\i
the fact i~ issue would be presumed.' The information sought to be elicited by the question wa'
not the fact in issue. The witness had testifietl
1
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negatively as to the fact in issue sought .t? be
established. 'Vas the fact sought to be ehc1ted,
to wit, an act of sexual intercourse prior to the
time alleged in the information and as to which
the state had elected to be bound, such fact that
from it the very fact in issue would be presumed?
'Ve think this question must be answered in the
negative .... " Id, 97 Utah at 291-98, 85 Pac.
2d 811-13.
See also State v. Cro"tXder, 119 Wash. 450, 205
Pac. 850 (1922); State v. LaMont, 23 S.D. 174, 120
N.W. 1104 (1909).
It is clear from a review of the decisions cited above
that the defendant in the instant case could not properly
be compelled to answer the questions regarding his
possible sexual relations with Betty Wallberg on or
prior to January 20, 1964. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in compelling the defendant to answer these questions. And such error was obviously and patently prejudicial to the defendant in this case. Joseph v. W. H.
Groves, Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318
P.2d 330 (1957); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631,
237 P.2d 834 ( 1951). As was stated by this Court in
Jnseph v. W. JI. Grove, Latter Day Saints Hospital,
supra, 7 Utah 2d at 44, 318 P.2d at 333.
"It is not always easy to tell wheu an error
should be regarded as prejudicial, as attested by
the division of the court in this case. It is necessary to survey all of the facts and circumstances
disclosed by the record and if, in so doing, the
error appears to be of such a nature that it can
be said with assurance that it was of no material
cm15equenee in its effect upon the trial because

19

reasonable minds would have arrived at the same
result, regardless of such error, it would be
harmless and the granting of a new trial would
not be warranted. On the other hand, if it appears to be of sufficient moment that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such
error a different result would have eventuated,
the error should be regarded as prejudicial and
relief should be granted."
In the instant case the answers which the defendant was
erroneously compelled to give, when considered by the
jury in connection with the most critical issue before
them, namely whether or not the defendant had sexual
relations with Betty "\Vallberg after January 27, 1965
which caused her to conceive the child, were ohriously
"of sufficient moment that there is a reasonable likelihood that in absence of such error a different result
would have eventuated."
Of course, the prejudicial effect of the trial court's
violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory
rights against self-incrimination does not exist alone
in the unfair and adverse impact that the improper
compulsory testimony must have had on the jury's
opinion ~{ the defendant's character. The essential
prejudice resulting from violation of the right against
self-incrimination has been stated on many occasions
to be the exposure to criminal prosecution. McCarthy
v. Arndstein, supra.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should
reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant the
defendant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY G. MARTINEAU
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
BENJAMIN SPENCE
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